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Abstract
This paper investigates the degree and nature of economic and mone-
tary policy relations among the United States, the Euro area, and Great
Britain. Using daily interest rates, we estimate the impact of monetary pol-
icy announcements of a Central Bank on its domestic market and in what
measure those announcements are able to inﬂuence other ﬁnancial markets.
In particular, we analyse the eﬀect of the FED, ECB, and BoE monetary
policy announcements on European markets. We ﬁnd that Europe’s interest
rates have a relevant response to FED announcements.
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11 Introduction
The main instrument of monetary policy is the setting of central bank rates,
which can either follow a “reaction function” — Taylor rule - or be decided
on a discretionary basis. In both cases it is very important how the central
bank announces its policy.
In the 1990’s numerous studies analysed the transmission mechanisms
of monetary policy, focusing particularly on the reaction of market interest
rates to the decisions and, more generally, to the monetary policy announce-
ments of central banks.
In our opinion, knowing how markets respond to monetary policy an-
nouncements is of extreme importance for both ﬁnancial operators and
monetary authorities: operators want to know how monetary policy will
aﬀect their decisions, and the central bank wishes to know how its decision
on interest rates is transmitted to the market and how much autonomy to
determine rates it actually enjoys.
It is interesting, with the increased globalisation of ﬁnancial markets,
to look also at how domestic interest rates are inﬂuenced by the monetary
policy announcements of a foreign central bank.
The aim of this study is to examine how the announcements of a central
bank are reﬂected on its domestic market and to what extent they are able
to inﬂuence the ﬁnancial markets of other countries. We analyse the eﬀects
of the FED’s, the ECB’s, and the BoE’s monetary policy announcements
on their own and other markets, using future rates to separate expected
from unexpected policy decisions. In accordance with the eﬃcient mar-
kets hypothesis, we show that the response of domestic interest rates to
the surprise component of monetary policy is stronger than the expected
component of policy action, but we also ﬁnd that Europe’s interest rates
respond signiﬁcantly to FED announcements. This amounts to a temporary
loss of monetary sovereignty for Europe’s central banks.
More generally, this ﬁnding can be used to improve the eﬀectiveness of
2monetary policy: it is in fact essential for a central bank to take account
of the capacity of others to communicate and of the leadership eﬀects this
has, if it wishes to conserve its sovereignty over its own yield curves at all
times.
2 Transmission channel
What are the channels through which monetary policy announcements by
the central bank of one country can cause changes on the domestic mar-
ket of another country? Generally speaking there are three main channels.
The ﬁr s td e p e n d so nt h er e g i m ei nw h i c ht h em o n e t a r yp o l i c yi ss e t .S o m e
central banks do in fact set themselves the target of stabilizing a relation-
ship in which one of the two variables involved is controlled by a foreign
central bank. This occurs for example when monetary policy seeks to sta-
bilize the exchange rate. In this case, monetary policy is determined by an
exogenous variable controlled by a foreign central bank. When that foreign
central bank announces a change in its monetary policy, this change also is
transmitted to the other monetary market.
The second channel is connected with the growing integration of ﬁnancial
markets and the relative spillover eﬀects. An announcement by one central
bank can in fact create arbitrage phenomena which tend to be eliminated
by movements of capital. Since the transaction costs of transferring capital
from one market to another are low in integrated ﬁnancial markets, an
announcement by a foreign central bank will generate capital ﬂows which
will have an impact on its domestic ﬁnancial markets.
Finally, the third channel is connected with the publishing of macroeco-
nomic data. A monetary policy announcement by a central bank may reveal
important economic information concerning another country. Consider, for
example, an economic outlook which contains explicit references to the eco-
nomic conditions of other economies or in any case useful information for
forecasting the economic performance of other countries.
33 A review of earlier studies
An early paper assessing market reactions to monetary policy actions is that
of Cook and Hahn (1989), who examined the one-day response of bond
rates to changes in the target Fed Funds rate from 1974 through 1979.
Cook and Hahn begin by compiling a record of the changes in the Federal
Reserve’s target over this period. They examine both the records of the
Federal Reserve Bank of New York (which implemented the changes) and
the reports of the changes in The Wall Street Journal. As Cook and Hahn
describe it, the actual Federal funds rate moves closely with the Federal
Reserve’s target. Moreover it is highly improbable that the Federal Reserve
was changing the target in response to factors that would have moved the
funds rate even in the absence of the policy changes, i.e. it is unlikely that
in the absence of the Federal Reserve’s actions the Federal funds rate would
have moved by discrete amounts. Their procedure was to regress the change
in the bill, note, and bond rates on the change in the Fed’s target funds rate
for a sample consisting of 75 days during which the Fed had changed the
f u n d sr a t et a r g e t . They ﬁnd that the response to the target rate increases is
positive and signiﬁcant at all maturities, but noticeably smaller at the long
end of the yield curve. In addition, Cook and Hahn examine the relationship
between changes in interest rates and future changes in the target, but they
ﬁnd little evidence that the target rate changes were anticipated.
In contrast with this research, Roley and Sellon (1995), using Cook and
Hahn’s eventstudy approach to the 1987-1995 period, ﬁnd a statistically
insigniﬁcant response of bond rates to changes in the target funds rate.
Later on, more sophisticated econometric procedures were used. Edelberg
and Marshall (1996), using a VAR (Vector Autoregressive) model to study
monetary policy, found a large response of bill rates to policy shocks, and
a small response of bond rates.
In 2001, Kuttner used the Federal Funds rate futures to separate ex-
pected from unexpected changes in the Federal Funds target rate. Examin-
4ing the impact of monetary policy on bill, note, and bond yields, the author
showed that the response of interest rates to expected changes is insigniﬁ-
cant, while the response to unexpected change is statistically signiﬁcant and
relevant to explain the impact of monetary policy changes. These results
support the hypothesis of rational expectations of economic agents.
Perez-Quiros and J. Sicilia (2002) examined the predictability of the
monetary policy of the ECB and analysed the impact of monetary policy
decisions on the yield curve, using daily data. As regards predictability,
their evidence suggested that markets have not been surprised by monetary
policy decisions of the ECB, i.e. markets have been able to predict the
Governing Council’s decisions on key ECB interest rates fairly accurately.
As regards transmission of the unexpected component of monetary policy
decisions to the yield curve, they provide evidence that meetings smooth
out the impact of the monetary policy shocks (daily changes in short-term
interest rates) which have been generated outside meeting days.
Ross (2002) looking at the relations between monetary policy announce-
ments and the market’s reaction, makes a comparative analysis on the mar-
ket’s ability to understand the ECB’s, FED’s, and BoE’s decisions. In this
work it appears that the market is able to anticipate correctly the FED’s
a n dt h eB o E ’ sd e c i s i o n s . W i t hr e g a r dt ot h eE C B ,t h em a r k e th a sd i ﬃ-
culty to anticipate changes in the interest rate. The author thinks that this
may be explained by the larger number of meetings, which are a source of
confusion.
Various studies on money markets in the literature consider the impor-
tance of foreign announcements to domestic markets. Kim, Kortian and
Sheen(2000) look at the Australian ﬁnancial market. They ﬁnd that Amer-
ican macroeconomic news aﬀects Australian interest rates.
In another study Gravelle and Moessner (2001) demonstrate that Cana-
dian interest rates are more aﬀected by news on the United States economy
than by that on the Canadian economy.
At the end, Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2002) analyse interdependence
5b e t w e e nt h eE u r oa r e aa n dt h eU Sa r e ai nt h ep e r i o d1 9 9 3 - 2 0 0 2 1.I np a r t i c -
ular, they examine how the release of macroeconomic news from the Euro
a r e aa n dU Sa r e ac a ni n ﬂuence domestic interest rates and interest rates of
the other area. The authors ﬁnd some spillover eﬀects from the USA into
the Euro area, noting that we are in the presence of an increasing inter-
dependence between these two areas. This interdependence appears very
similar to what we shall call dependence.
3.1 Expectations using futures
The measurement of market expectations constitutes an important aspect
of our analysis. It is well known that the measurement of expectations
of future monetary policy decisions is rather complex. A broad ranging
literature has grown in recent years on the use of asset prices to measure
expectations.
In particular, Kuttner (2001) and Faust, Swanson and Wright (2001)
use the current month Federal Funds futures contract to measure the ex-
pectations on the Federal Funds rate. Other authors like Bomﬁm (2003)
and Poole and Rasche (2000) use the month-ahead Federal Funds futures
contract.
In 2002 Gurkaynak, Sack, and Swanson looked at the optimal market-
based measures of monetary policy expectations for up to ﬁve months. Their
predictive power for the future Federal Funds rate is the highest. In particu-
lar, a very simple measure of the unexpected component of monetary policy
decisions consists of the diﬀerence between the appropriate futures price on
the day before the announcement and on the announcement day. Following
this line, as described in Kuttner (2001), a monetary policy surprise can be
measured by the changes in the “spot month” futures rate calculated on the
relevant successive days. This measure is subject to a scaling factor, m
m−t,
used to adjust the measure to the days of eﬀective change. Analitically we













t is the surprise generated by unexpected changes to the interest
rates, f0
s,t is the spot month future rate the day t of the month s and m is
t h en u m b e ro fd a y si nam o n t h 2.
Once we have a surprise generated by monetary policy decisions we can
measure market’s expectations in this way:
∆r
e




t is the expected monetary policy decision while ∆rt is the change
in the interest rate operated by the monetary policy authority. In this
work we use a slightly diﬀerent approach. In fact, we use the futures con-
tract with expiration one month ahead; so our approach is quite similar to
Bomﬁm (2003). With this correction from Kuttner (2001) we compute the
unexpected component of monetary policy decisions using (1) without the
scaling factor. The criteria we use to measure expected monetary policy
decisions remains the same (2).
3.2 Measuring the announcement impact
This section explains the model we have estimated to measure the impact
of monetary policy decisions. Basically we use the model described by Cook
and Hahn (1989) with the improvements of Kuttner (2001). This analysis
consists of an OLS regression3 where the dependent variable is a one-day
response4 of interest rates, and the independent variable is the change in the
2 m
m−t it is the scaling factor.
3Poole, Rasche, Thornton (2002) underline that the use of the OLS method of esti-
mation could give distorted results. The distortion is due to the diﬀerent ways in which
markets process new information. They nevertheless also aﬃrm that the diﬀerences
between estimates made using the OLS method and those made using the “errors in
variable” method are generally very small.
4In actual fact the change is calculated between the rate on the day of the announce-
ment and the rate on the following day.
7Fed Funds target. Kuttner (2001) uses Cook and Hahn’s model adjusted for
expectations. Speciﬁcally, using the futures contract as mentioned above,
Kuttner splits the change in target into expected and unexpected monetary
components. We estimate the following equation:




t + εt (3)
w h e r eRi st h ey i e l do ft h er a t ee x a m i n e d ,β is the response to expected
and unexpected changes to the target.
Like Kuttner, ∆R is computed as the one-day response to monetary
policy decision. In this way we can outline market’s adjustment after mon-
etary policy decisions. The coeﬃcient β2 give us the possibility to measure
the surprise component. This measure is very useful to understand if the
market believes that it is important news while β1 “expected response”
represents the information already known by operators. This econometric
exercise permits us to gain indications on the ability of a Central Bank
to control its yield curve, and to analyse the behaviour of non-domestic
markets in relation to announcements of another Central Bank. We expect
a value of α very close to zero, a value of β1 statistically not signiﬁcant
and close to zero, and a β2 statistically signiﬁcant and close to one. These
theoretical results are obtained from the rational expectation model which
postulates market response only to new information.
4 The sample for the money market analysis
The time series of the interest rates examined are Euribor one month, and
one year; LIBOR one month and one year. The model examines interest
rate variations between the announcement day and the next day. The exoge-
nous variables are the Central Bank’s changes in monetary policy, measured
by variations in the key interest rates directly determined by the Central
Banks, for their respective money markets: Main Reﬁnancing Operations
(MRO) for Euro-zone, and repo for UK market. To measure market expec-
8tations, we use data from the futures markets, in particular, the one month
Euribor, and the three-month futures on GBP (Great Britain Pound), both
with expiration one month ahead. The analysis covers the period between
1st January 1999 and 31st December 2003. During this period we have
outlined the monetary policy meetings of the three Central Banks. It is
i m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a tw ec o n s i d e ra l lm e e t i n g sa n dn o to n l yt h o s ef o l -
lowed by a monetary policy change. This is justiﬁe db yt h ef a c tt h a te v e r y
meeting gives information that helps operators to form their expectations,
inﬂuencing the trend of interest rates. In the period analysed the ECB had
a greater number of meetings than the FED and the BoE (Table 1), the
ECB had 95 meetings, the FED 40, and the BoE 605.
N. Meeting % N. Meeting % N. Meeting %
Mantained 24 60.00% 80 84.21% 43 71.67%
Change 
0.50% 1 2.50% 2 2.11% 0 0.00%
0.25% 5 12.50% 5 5.26% 5 8.33%
-0.25% 4 10.00% 3 3.16% 10 16.67%
-0.50% 6 15.00% 5 5.26% 2 3.33%
Total of Meeting 40 95 60
Table 1: Number of meetings and decisions
Decision
FED ECB BoE
In short, the youngest of the three Banks had more meetings than the
o t h e r s .W eh a v et or e m e m b e rt h a tt h eE C Bh a dt w om e e t i n g sp e rm o n t h .
It left its interest rates unchanged in 84.2% of those meetings, raised them
by a half point in 2.1% and by a quarter of a point (percent) in 5.3% of
meetings. It reduced them by a quarter of a point and by half a point
respectively in 5.3% and 3.2% of the meetings.
The Federal Reserve left its interest rates unchanged in 60% of its meet-
ings, raised them by half a point and by a quarter-point respectively in
2.5% and 12.5% of its meetings, and reduced them by a quarter-point and
5For the FED we use unscheduled meetings as well.
9half-point respectively in 10% and 15% of its meetings. The Bank of Eng-
land left its interest rates unchanged in 71.7% of its meetings, raised them
by a quarter-point in 8.3% and it reduced them by a quarter-point and a
half-point respectively in 16.7% and 3.3% of its meetings.
5 The results
The main econometric results are reported in Table 2. The ﬁrst important
point to be observed is the general statistical appearance of the estimated
parameters, which conﬁrms the adequacy of the empirical model. The in-
tercept and expected response are approximately equal to zero or are sta-
tistically insigniﬁcant. By contrast analysing unexpected response, we can
observe how the Euro-zone money market immediately responds to “mone-
tary policy surprises” announced by the ECB, and its interest rates react to
the ECB’s monetary policy decisions. In particular, we can see how short
term interest rates reﬂect almost entirely the variation announced (the co-
eﬃcient of unexpected response is close to one), while the longer money





Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
Euribor 1 month 0.005 0.069 0.952
t stat 1.311 2.281 13.826
Euribor 12 month 0.009 0.014 0.777
t stat 2.32 0.479 11.051
LIBOR 1 month -0.006 0.031 0.738
t stat -1.55 1.1 7.84
LIBOR 12 month -0.001 0.017 1.023
t stat -0.468 0.747 13.334
Table 2: The Response of Interest Rates to ECB's decisions.
0.66 1.86 91.71
0 . 3 9 21 . 8 83 1 . 0 3
0.573 2.169 63.536






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
Euribor 1 month -0.005 0.012 0.799
t stat -2.132 0.875 6.342
Euribor 12 month -0.003 0.013 0.855
t stat -0.707 0.562 3.933
LIBOR 1 month -0.003 0.027 0.283
t stat -0.799 1.383 2.417
LIBOR 12 month 0.004 0.04 0.373
t stat 0.701 1.651 2.531




The 1-day response of interest rates to changes in the Fed funds target 
0.653 2.34 37.732
With regard to the relations between the ECB’s decisions and the British
money market there are interesting results. The adjusted R-square is high,
and β2 close to one; furthermore, diﬀerently from what happens in the
Euro-zone money market, these results are conﬁrmed also for longer money
market interest rates. A good explanation could be derived from the fact
that the ECB’s meetings and the BoE’s meetings are often on the same
days. From 2002 to 2003, 23 ECB’s meetings, 17 happened on the same days
as those of the BoE, and 11 meetings were followed by the same decisions6.
Now consider the Federal Reserve. From Table 3 we see the response
to the FED’s announcement in the Euro-zone, and British money markets.
The model which describes Euro-zone interest rates’ reaction to the FED’s
announcements appears statistically signiﬁc a n t ,w i t ha ni n t e r c e p ta n da n
“expected response” close to zero, an unexpected response close to one and
an R-squared also very good.
The same thing cannot be said of the British market. The British rates
do react to FED announcements but to a much lesser extent.
6Clearly this coincidence in the dates aﬀects the estimates made. It must nevertheless
be underlined that in the 11 meetings in which the ECB and the BoE took the same
decision, this always coincided with leaving interest rates unchanged. On the contrary,
in the other 6 meetings, rates were changed, but always by a diﬀerent amount.
11Concerning possible spillover eﬀects from FED to other markets, Euro-
zone interest rates do indeed react to the FED announcements, but not
apparently British ones. The result suggests that the Europe-zone money
market takes into account decisions made by the FED, and is ready to
adjust its yield curve fully only after the FED’s monetary policy decisions7.
A greater level of independency seems to characterize the British money
market.





Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
Euribor 1 month 0.005 0.059 0.943
t stat 0.877 1.545 7.266
Euribor 12 month 0.006 0.007 0.83
t stat 1.398 0.242 7.715
LIBOR 1 month -0.009 0.204 0.976
t stat -1.477 4.531 11.08
LIBOR 12 month 0.003 0.006 1.105
t stat 0.757 0.194 16.663
140.113






The 1-day response of interest rates to changes in the repo rate 
0.465
Here too the signiﬁcance of the estimated model is conﬁrmed. The Bank
of England seems able to control yields curve at least up to a maturity of
one year. However in contrast with the other Central Banks, the inﬂuence
of the BoE’s decisions is stronger on the LIBOR 1 year than on the LIBOR
1 month rate. Of course, it is possible to explain this by recalling that the
BoE does not use a speciﬁct a r g e tf o rt h es h o r t e ri n t e r e s tr a t e s ,p r e f e r r i n g
to focus on the longer one. Euro-zone interest rates appear sensitive to the
BoE’s monetary policy decisions. Both Euribor one-month and one-year
7Conﬁrmation of this is given by 40 FED meetings followed by as many as 29 ECB
meetings with changes in the same direction: the ECB left rates unchanged 20 times and
changed them 9 times.
12interest rates show a ready response to the unexpected monetary policy
change. Again the coincidence of BoE and ECB’s meetings may be relevant.
6 T h ei n t e r e s t - r a t er e s p o n s eo nt h eb o n dm a r -
ket
Having examined the response of monetary markets to the monetary policy
announcements of the three central banks under study here, we will now
focus on an analysis of the longer term markets, those of bonds. As is
known, the rates that are set in those markets constitute indicators used by
many economic operators in their decision making.
The purpose of this section is to study the eﬀects of FED monetary
p o l i c yo nb o n dm a r k e t si nt h ee u r oa r e aa n di nG r e a tB r i t a i ni no r d e rt os e e
whether those markets are in some way dependent on FED announcements.
An econometric analysis is therefore conducted to investigate the eﬀects
of FED, BoE and ECB announcements on British and Euro-zone ﬁnancial
markets. It would seem plausible to expect each bank to control the time
structure of its own rates and therefore Euro-zone and British market rates
should respond principally to the announcements of the ECB and the BoE
respectively and only marginally to FED announcements.
The results of the analysis are given in tables 5, 6 and 7. Table 5
shows the response of interest rates to ECB changes in MRO’s on British
and Euro-zone markets, while table 6 gives the response to BoE changes
in repos on these markets and ﬁnally table 7 shows the response to FED
c h a n g e si nt h ef e d e r a lf u n dt a r g e to nt h es a m em a r k e t s .
The ﬁrst thing to note is that the results are signiﬁcant. Here too, as
with the analysis of money markets, we can conclude that the empirical
m o d e le m p l o y e di sa d e q u a t eb e c a u s et he intercept and expected response
coeﬃcients are approximately equal to zero. This conﬁrms that interest
rates only respond to new elements in the monetary policy announcements.
13Examination of table 5 shows that the unexpected response to 2 and
3 year rates in the euro area is statistically signiﬁcant. This coeﬃcient
becomes rapidly less signiﬁcant with longer term maturity dates, which
leads to the conclusion that the ECB has a degree of inﬂuence on the time
structure of its rates up to maturities of 3 years.
T h es a m ea n a l y s i so ft a b l e6s h o w st h a tt h eB o Ea l s oe ﬀectively controls
t h et i m es t r u c t u r eo fi t si n t e r e s tr a t e su pt om a t u r i t i e so f3y e a r sa n dh e r e
too the unexpected response coeﬃcient is fairly substantial, especially for 2
and 3 year rates.
If we now look at table 7, which shows the role of FED announcements on
the Euro-zone and British markets, we see rather interesting results. Inter-
est rates on the Euro-zone market react perfectly to FED announcements.
The unexpected response coeﬃcient for 2 and 3 year rates is approximately
equal to 1. This coeﬃcient decreases slightly for 5 to 7 year maturity rates,
but still continues to be signiﬁcant up to 10 years.
Similarly if we observe that rates on British markets respond strongly
to FED intervention, with an unexpected response coeﬃcient of 0.9 for the
two year rate, of 0.77 for the 3 year rate and an in any case signiﬁcant
response up to 5 years.
The results that emerged from this comparative analysis are therefore
extremely interesting. While it is true that the ECB and the BoE control the
time structure of their own rates fairly signiﬁcantly up to 3 years, it is also
true that the FED not only controls the same rates up to almost 10 years,
but these rates seem to respond more strongly to FED announcements than
they do to those of the other Central Banks.
7C o n c l u s i o n
The study shows that BoE, and ECB are able to control their own monetary
markets in a signiﬁcant manner. However, when we shifted our attention to
bond markets, we found that for long term bonds in particular, the British
14and Euro-zone markets are very sensitive to FED decisions. Not only do
the rates respond to FED announcements, but FED decisions actually have
a greater impact than that produced by the central banks in question8.
The reasons for this FED leadership9 are certainly multiple and not
always easy to identify. One initial reason could, however, be connected
with market size. The American market is decidedly larger than the Euro-
zone and British markets in terms of volumes traded. It would therefore be
plausible to expect that ﬁnancial operators have a greater interest in and
t a k em o r ea c c o u n to fe v e n t so nt h a tm a r k e t .
A second factor that may explain FED leadership could be closely linked
with the communication strategies10 adopted by central banks. When a
central bank makes a monetary policy change, it oﬃcially announces its
decisions to the market. The methods adopted by the central bank for
making the communication are very important because they help shape the
expectations of market operators.
As is known, in recent years central banks have tended to implement
policies by transparently manifesting their intentions in advance to some
degree. This transparency helps increase the ability of operators to under-
stand the decisions of the monetary authority, which improves the eﬀective-
ness of the monetary decision. Jansen e de Haan (2004) claim that ECB
8With regard to the United States, Kuttner found that the FED has good control over
its own market in both the short and long term. For the sake of thorough investigation we
also analysed the reactions of United States’ rates to ECB and BoE announcements. Put
brieﬂy, no signiﬁcant response by the United States’ market to ECB and BoE monetary
policies was found. This allows us to exclude the hypothesis that rational agents give
equal consideration to all central banks in a global economy.
9This also conﬁrms the ﬁndings of Breuss F. (2002) who found a causal relationship
between the FED’s monetary decisions and those of the ECB. Accordingly, the ECB
follows those of the FED with a lag of 4-6 months.
10The fact that the FED today is discussing the adoption of targets (Wang, J., 2005),
when Greenspan retires, seems to underline the importance of the reputation and com-
municative skills of the current FED chairman.
15statements were rather contradictory in this respect in its ﬁrst few years11.
While its statements on interest rates have become more consistent in recent
y e a r s ,i t ss t a t e m e n t so ng r o w t ha n di n ﬂation are still ambiguous.
A third element, strictly connected with the previous one, is the repu-
tation of the bank itself. This reputation is a direct function of the central
bank’s ability to pursue the monetary policy objectives that it sets itself.
Financial operators could therefore place their trust in the good reputation
of the FED, while they are still unable to judge the ability of the ECB. The
ECB is in fact too young for operators to be able to express an opinion on
its ability to achieve the monetary policy objectives it sets itself, especially
in the long term.
While the ECB’s reputation is young, the same cannot be said of the
BoE, which is the oldest central bank in the world. Looking at the results,
the BoE does not seem to be subject to FED leadership: the BoE, at least as
far as the British monetary market is concerned, demonstrates that it knows
how to adjust its rates, which are not very sensitive to FED announcements.
Finally, the Euro-zone and British ﬁnancial markets are in a situation
which will not become ﬁnal for a few years to come. While on the one hand
ﬁnancial integration in the EMU area is not yet complete, on the other hand
Great Britain has not yet decided to enter the EMU. It is possible, in such
a context, that operators are more interested in basing their decisions on
the FED which operates on a decidedly more stable market.
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Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year 0.007 -0.016 0.653
t stat 1.105 -0.329 5.733
3 year 0.009 -0.036 0.543
t stat 1.31 -0.693 4.581
 5 year 0.002 -0.07 0.434
t stat 0.435 -1.399 3.800
7 year -0.009 -0.035 0.212
t stat -1.628 -0.776 2.059
 10 year -0.001 -0.075 0.205
t stat -0.267 -1.828 2.201
15 year 0.002 -0.098 0.207
t stat 0.364 -2.323 2.144
20 year -0.013 -0.021 0.018
t stat -2.404 -0.517 0.194
30 year -0.012 -0.071 0.054
t stat -2.251 -1.781 0.590






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year 0 0.004 0.895
t stat 0.016 0.170 9.751
3 year 0.0076 0.009 0.754
t stat 1.450 0.285 6.674
 5 year 0.006 0.012 0.654
t stat 1.385 0.382 6.253
7 year 0.008 0.019 0.56
t stat 1.571 0.591 5.067
 10 year 0.008 0.011 0.431
t stat 1.455 0.326 3.592
15 year 0.005 0.001 0.346
t stat 1.034 0.034 3.111
20 year 0.004 0.004 0.288
t stat 0.830 0.130 2.667
30 year 0.002 0.003 0.234
t stat 0.558 0.096 2.147

















Table 5: The Response of Interest Rates to ECB's Decisions.
0.028 1.852






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year 0.008 -0.012 0.668
t stat 1.073 -0.248 3.800
3 year 0.008 -0.040 0.514
t stat 1.086 -0.855 3.155
 5 year 0.003 -0.061 0.442
t stat 0.399 -1.245 2.615
7 year 0.003 -0.065 0.393
t stat 0.714 -1.065 1.879
 10 year -0.001 -0.054 0.209
t stat -0.177 -1.191 1.333
15 year 0.002 0.014 0.451
t stat 0.365 0.307 2.814
20 year -0.0009 -0.081 -0.043
t stat -0.135 -1.752 -0.271
30 year -0.007 -0.113 0.102
t stat -1.11 -2.480 0.651






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year -0.0002 -0.04 0.705
t stat -0.048 -0.994 8.920
3 year 0.006 -0.066 0.574
t stat 0.865 -1.332 5.898
 5 year 0.004 -0.101 0.436
t stat 0.745 -2.264 4.992
7 year 0.004 -0.117 0.304
t stat 0.732 -2.522 3.351
 10 year 0.006 -0.126 0.2
t stat 0.887 -2.470 2.000
15 year 0.006 -0.105 0.163
t stat 0.897 -2.140 1.690
20 year 0.005 -0.103 0.145
t stat 0.843 -2.129 1.534
30 year 0.005 -0.104 0.13
t stat 0.773 -2.166 1.380


















Table 6: The Response of Interest Rates to BoE's Decisions.
0.082 1.657






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year -0.003 0.01 1.034
t stat -0.463 0.277 3.15
3 year -0.004 -0.006 1.021
t stat -0.667 -0.182 3.139
 5 year -0.0002 -0.007 0.856
t stat -0.03 -0.188 2.293
7 year 0.007 0.02 0.977
t stat 0.966 0.469 2.577
 10 year -0.001 0.013 0.521
t stat -0.24 0.353 1.564
15 year 0.009 -0.024 0.267
t stat 1.367 -0.68 0.84
20 year 0.006 0.038 0.121
t stat 0.724 0.773 0.28
30 year -0.0002 0.012 0.299
t stat -0.04 0.426 1.15






Unexpected Adj R^2 DW  F-Stat
 2 year 0.012 0.044 0.902
t stat 1.537 1.327 4.490
3 year 0.014 0.055 0.766
t stat 1.498 1.453 3.314
 5 year 0.011 0.058 0.600
t stat 1.143 1.442 2.465
7 year 0.013 0.072 0.296
t stat 1.306 1.717 1.172
 10 year 0.014 0.082 0.143
t stat 1.299 1.899 0.547
15 year 0.012 0.074 0.096
t stat 1.165 1.737 0.377
20 year 0.011 0.069 0.048
t stat 1.083 1.626 0.188
30 year 0.01 0.062 0.072
t stat 0.955 1.474 0.286

















Table 7: The Response of Interest Rates to FED's Decisions.
2.399 1.088
21